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INJURY BY ALGORITHM:  A LOOK INTO 
GOOGLE'S LIABILITY FOR DEFAMATORY 
AUTOCOMPLETED SEARCH SUGGESTIONS 
Seema Ghatnekar* 
 
Google’s Autocomplete search feature has gained wide popularity as 
it allows users to perform search queries quickly by suggesting several 
search terms in real-time as users type a search request in the Google 
search bar.  These generated suggestions change in an algorithmic manner 
with each additional letter that a user types into Google’s search bar while 
conducting a search.  They are based in part upon predictions made from 
previous users’ searches as well as several other factors related to the 
popularity and volume of search queries.  As a result, Google claims its 
lacks complete control over the Autocomplete search results and that it 
should not be held liable for the search results the algorithms generate 
while a user conducts a Google search.  Google used this defense in several 
cases that surfaced globally after the search queries generated defamatory 
suggestions.  Accordingly, as detailed in this Article, this point brings 
about troubling legal issues due to a lack of understanding who is actually 
responsible for the results generated by Google’s Autocomplete feature.  
Thus far, given the current state of Internet law, Google falls in a legal safe 
harbor in avoiding liability for defamatory suggestions.  Nonetheless, a 
better legal framework must be established to determine Google’s true 
liability in generating defamatory search suggestions through its 
algorithmic based approach. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Larry Page, co-founder and CEO of Google, described a “perfect 
search engine” as one that “understands exactly what you mean and gives 
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you back exactly what you want.”1  One way that Google attempts to 
provide this perfection is through its “patented PageRank™ algorithm, 
which analyzes websites that have been ‘voted’ to be the best sources of 
information by other pages across the web” by “using more than 200 
signals and a variety of techniques.”2  Today, most individuals who have 
conducted a Google search are aware of Google’s PageRank, or 
Autocomplete, search feature.3  Autocomplete provides individuals with a 
seemingly simple way to search items by suggesting several search terms in 
real-time as an individual types a search request in the Google search bar.4  
These suggestions change in an algorithmic manner, with each additional 
letter that a user types into Google’s search bar while conducting a search.5 
The search algorithms are further detailed in this Article, but are 
fundamentally generated from the universe of others users’ searches in 
Google, along with “an algorithm that is based on several factors related to 
the popularity and volume of search queries.”6  Due to this social 
algorithmic variation based, in part, upon predictions made from previous 
users’ searches, Google claims that it should not be held liable for the 
search results the algorithms generate while a user conducts a Google 
search.7  In light of this expressed lack of complete control, Google 
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Article.  She gives special thanks to Professors Karl M. Manheim and Tracey L. Freed for 
providing their expertise and perspective on how to approach this topic.  She would like to 
express her sincerest gratitude to the staff (especially to editors Sean Montgomery and Arpine 
Hovasapyan) of the Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review for each person’s 
contribution to this Article.  Finally, she would like to thank the individual reader who has taken 
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1.  Our Products and Services, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/about/company/products/ 
(last visited Sept. 4, 2013).  
2.  Ten Things We Know to Be True, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/about/company/ 
philosophy/ (last visited Sept. 4, 2013). 
3.  See Danny Sullivan, How Google Instant’s Autocomplete Suggestions Work, SEARCH 
ENGINE LAND (Apr. 6, 2011, 6:27 PM), http://searchengineland.com/how-google-instant-
autocomplete-suggestions-work-62592. 
4.  See id.   
5.  See id.  
6.  David Angotti, Court Orders Google Autocomplete Changes:  Japanese Man Defamed 
by Algorithm, SEARCH ENGINE J. (Mar. 26, 2012), http://www.searchenginejournal.com/google-
autocomplete-defamation-case/41864/. 
7.  See Sullivan, supra note 3.  
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contends that the Autocomplete search results do not stem from a system 
designed to invade one’s privacy, nor do they attribute connotations—
negative or positive—to an individual.
8
  This point brings about troubling 
legal issues, specifically due to a lack of understanding who is actually 
responsible for the results generated by Google’s Autocomplete feature.9 
Several cases have surfaced globally that shed light on this legal gray 
area.  For example, in the United States, the most recent case against 
Google was brought forth by Dr. Guy Hingston, a cancer surgeon from 
Australia.10  Hingston filed his lawsuit in the Central District of California, 
complaining that he was portrayed in a false light through Google’s 
Autocomplete suggestion of “guy hingston bankrupt.”11  Consequently, 
Hingston asserted that his reputation as a surgeon was damaged, resulting 
in a loss of a number of patients and financiers.12  This case has yet to be 
resolved as of the date of this Article, but it will be interesting to see how 
the law will play out in the United States. 
Numerous examples exist in the international context.  In April 2012, 
a French organization sued Google in France for suggesting that 
individuals, such as Rupert Murdoch and Jon Hamm, are Jewish.13  During 
the same time frame, Germany’s former First Lady Bettina Wulff sued 
Google because its Autocomplete feature implied that she was a former 
                                                          
8.  Autocomplete does not invade privacy because “Google does not determine [the 
Autcomplete search terms] manually – all of the quaries show in autocomplete have been typed 
previously by other Google users.” Angotti, supra note 6; see generally Sullivan, supra note 3 
(stating that Google’s Autocomplete search terms are “predicted by computer algorithms based 
on seach terms from previous users, not by Google itself”). 
9.  See generally Anthony Ciolli, Chilling Effects:  The Communications Decency Act and 
the Online Marketplace of Ideas, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 137, 138 (2008) (suggesting that the 
Internet provides a platform on which it is difficult to attribute blame to an entity that is 
unknown). 
10.  Jeffrey P. Hermes, Filing Lawsuits in the United States Over Google Autocomplete Is 
. . . , DIGITAL MEDIA L. PROJECT (Jan. 23, 2013), http://www.citmedialaw.org/blog/2013/filing-
lawsuits-united-states-over-google-autocomplete. 
11.  Id.  
12.  Asher Moses, Australian Surgeon Sues Google Over ‘Bankrupt’ Autocomplete, THE 
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Jan. 22, 2013), http://www.smh.com.au/technology/technology-
news/australian-surgeon-sues-google-over-bankrupt-autocomplete-20130122-2d480.html; see 
also Hermes, supra note 10.  
13.  See Eriq Gardner, Google Sued for Suggesting Rupert Murdoch and Other Celebrities 
Are Jewish, THE HOLLYWOOD REP. (Apr. 30, 2012, 10:28 AM), 
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/google-sued-rupert-murdoch-jon-hamm-jewish-318012. 
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escort or prostitute.14  More recently, on November 12, 2012, an Australian 
music promoter, Michael Trkulja, prevailed against Google because its 
Autocomplete feature incorrectly associated him with organized crime and 
murder.15  All of the aforementioned plaintiffs based their respective 
lawsuits on defamation law principles—the theory that a false statement 
can damage an individual’s reputation.16 
The previous examples detail lawsuits in international legal forums 
because courts within the United States have yet to squarely address 
Google’s potential liability for similar conduct.  This Article takes a 
different perspective and analyzes the potential liability that Google may 
suffer for defamation lawsuits instituted by plaintiffs within the United 
States because of the search suggestions that are generated through its 
Autocomplete search feature.  The focus of this Article is how this situation 
may come up in the United States, and specifically in California.  It is 
evident through case law that Google is capable of censoring material that 
is placed in its search bar.17  Therefore, one issue this Article will explore is 
whether this editorial control subjects Google to an inherent liability and 
responsibility to maintain the search algorithms that others may find on its 
website. 
To begin this analysis, Part II provides an overview of how search 
engines, and more specifically, an Autocomplete feature, made popular by 
Google, work.  Part III highlights the defamatory lawsuits won by public 
and private individuals in international courts against Google for the 
negative and false inferences that resulted from its Autocomplete feature.  
Next, Part IV summarizes the relevant case law and statutes necessary to 
determine Google’s potential liability in this legal gray area, namely 
California’s comprehensive defamation laws and the Communications 
Decency Act (“CDA”).  Part V examines Google’s potential liability under 
this legal framework.  Finally, Part VI suggests changes that Google can 
                                                          
14.  See Frederic Lardinois, Germany’s Former Foreign First Lady Sues Google for 
Defamation Over Autocomplete Suggestions, TECH CRUNCH (Sept. 7, 2012), 
http://techcrunch.com/2012/09/07/germanys-former-first-lady-sues-google-for-defamation-over-
autocomplete-suggestions/. 
15.  T.C. Sottek, Google Loses Australian Defamation Case After Court Rules That It Is 
Accountable as a Publisher, THE VERGE (Nov. 26, 2012, 6:38 PM), 
http://www.theverge.com/2012/11/26/3694908/google-defamation-australia-publisher. 
16.  See, e.g., Gobin v. Globe Publ’g Co., 649 P.2d 1239, 1243 (Kan. 1982) (“[D]amage to 
one’s reputation is the essence and gravamen of an action for defamation.”). 
17.  See David Angotti, Google Autocomplete Faces New Lawsuit for “Jewish” 
Autocomplete Suggestions, SEARCH ENGINE J. (May 1, 2012), 
http://www.searchenginejournal.com/google-autocomplete-jewish-murdoch/43137/. 
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make to its search engine in order to minimize liability within the United 
States. 
II.  SEARCH ENGINES 
Search engines are the new linchpins of the Internet.  A large 
and growing fraction of the Internet’s immense volume of traffic 
flows through them.  They are librarians, who bring order to the 
chaotic online accumulation of information.  They are 
messengers, who bring writers and readers together.  They are 
critics, who elevate content to prominence or consign it to 
obscurity.  They are inventors, who devise new technologies and 
business models to remake the Internet.  And they are spies, who 
are asked to carry out investigations with dispatch and 
discretion.18 
Because of this innovation and the constant flux surrounding the 
changing technology of the Internet, legal principles seem to always lag 
behind technology.19  This Article deals with a feature of Google’s search 
engine that has not been analyzed thoroughly to date, due in part to the 
recent emergence of Google’s Autocomplete feature onto the site in 2008.20  
This section details how search engines generally work, and then analyzes 
how Google’s Autocomplete feature differs from what currently exists 
under search engine platforms. 
A.  How Search Engines Generally Work 
Typically, searches involve four modes of information flow: (1) the 
search engine accumulates content; (2) a user “queries the search engine” 
by typing in the desired information; (3) the search engine delivers results 
to the query; and (4) the user receives the content.21  The parties involved 
online include “search engines,” “content providers,” “users,” and 
“concerned third parties,” such as copyright holders or governments 
                                                          
18.  James Grimmelmann, The Structure of Search Engine Law, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1, 3 
(2007). 
19.  See generally id. (“Governments around the world are casting an increasingly 
skeptical eye on search engines . . . [with] [m]ore and more parties . . . presenting themselves at 
the courthouse door with plausible stories of how they have been injured by search engines.”).  
20.  See generally Jennifer Liu, At a Loss for Words?, GOOGLE OFFICIAL BLOG (Aug. 25, 
2008), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2008/08/at-loss-for-words.html (describing the 2008 
public launch of Google’s “Google Suggest”). 
21.  Grimmelmann, supra note 18, at 7.  
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inclined to censor material.22  Liability in an Internet action generally stems 
from the interactions between some or all of these entities.23 
A search engine permits a user to type in search terms to relay 
information.24 Traditionally, once a user types in a search term and clicks 
“Enter,” the search engine scans through its database to find the entered 
terms and then catalogues the terms in different ways.25  The process of 
cataloguing terms is referred to as “indexing.”26  Indexing information is 
exhibited in the interplay between search engines and content providers in 
distributing content to a search engine’s users.27  Indexing can either be 
done automatically through software agents that search the web for relevant 
content, or through other types of information gathering.28  These different 
forms of information gathering include search engines which organize 
previously collected information, content providers providing information 
to search engines, or paid search inclusion, where content providers pay 
search engines to supply content for a fee that ensures the content 
providers’ information will be indexed in the manner requested by the 
content providers.29 
A search query is a user’s request for information about a topic.30  
Search queries can vary from keywords to short phrases.31  Generally, users 
perform three queries: (1) navigational queries to find specific sites or sets 
of information; (2) informational queries to find out information about a 
topic; or (3) transactional queries to purchase particular goods or perform 
activities.32  Different search engines weigh various factors while 
performing a search query, which may influence the particular information 
                                                          
22.  Id. at 15.  
23.  Id.   
24.  3 PATRICIA E. SALKIN, NEW YORK ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE § 37:05 (Westlaw 
2012). 
25.  Id.  
26.  See Grimmelmann, supra note 18, at 7; see also SALKIN, supra note 24 (contrasting 
the indexing method used by Yahoo! and Alta Vista).   
27.  See Grimmelmann, supra note 18, at 7.  
28.  Id. at 7–8. 
29.  Id. at 8. 
30.  Id.  
31.  Id.  
32.  Id. at 9. 
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that is generated.33  These factors may include geographic information 
about a user, influence based on past user searches, or a user’s operating 
system or browser.
34
  When a user enters search terms in a search engine, 
the search engine logs the user’s query terms along with information about 
the type of web browser, version of web browser, IP address, and “cookie” 
data.35  Cookies enable search engines to store data about an individual, 
including the user’s email address (if a user is signed in) and a user’s past 
search results.36 
Delivering relevant content to a user is the defining moment of a web 
search.37  Search engines typically list out results on a page from an order 
deemed most to least relevant to the query.38  The search results contain 
“the name of the identified piece of content, its location, and a very short 
summary or excerpt that shows how the content relates to the query.”39  
Based on the generated content, a user may make additional queries to 
narrow down a search with the addition or removal of keywords within the 
query.40 
Search engines differ in the way that they generate their search 
queries, through the use of various algorithms to organize and condense all 
of the content that is available from their content providers.41  When search 
engines first emerged, they scanned through text on web pages to assess the 
topics that a web page centered on.42  Now, search engines scan through 
and analyze other information called “metadata” on web pages.43  Metadata 
is information, invisible in a hard copy of a document, but visible in its 
native, digital format through the original program that produced the 
                                                          
33.  James Grimmelmann, The Structure of Search Engine Law, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1, 9 
(2007). 
34.  Id.  
35.  Ron A. Dolin, Search Query Privacy:  The Problem of Anonymization, 2 HASTINGS 
SCI. & TECH. L.J. 137, 138 (2010). 
36.  Id.  
37.  Grimmelmann, supra note 18, at 9. 
38.  Id. 
39.  Id.  
40.  Id.  
41.  Id. at 10. 
42.  Id.  
43.  James Grimmelmann, The Structure of Search Engine Law, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1, 10 
(2007). 
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document.44  Metadata is often referred to as “data about data” because it 
“describes, explains, locates, or otherwise makes it easier to retrieve, use, 
or manage an information resource.”
45
  The three main types of metadata 
are descriptive, structural, and administrative metadata.46  Descriptive 
metadata includes information that identifies the source material, such as 
the author, title, abstract, or keywords linked to the material.47  Structural 
metadata sheds light into the way a source is organized and put together, 
such as the order of page numbers within chapters.48  Finally, 
administrative metadata includes information about the actual source in 
order to manage the source.49  It includes technical information, including 
when the source was created, the file type of the source, intellectual 
property rights of a source, and general management information.50 
Further, search engines utilize a technique called search engine 
optimization (“SEO”) to provide users with content that a search engine 
considers most important to the public.51  SEO is based on weighing 
several ranking factors that the search engine deems most relevant and 
authoritative.52  “Search engines are able to preserve a layer of genuine, 
useful results through a combination of keeping precise algorithmic details 
secret and changing their algorithms to foil detected SEO techniques.”53  
Along the same lines as metadata, search engines utilize HTML meta tags, 
which are essentially data tags for web pages that include text which is not 
displayed, but communicates to browsers through a code that details 
                                                          
44.  Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, Discoverability of Metadata, 29 A.L.R. 6TH 167 
(2007); see also 1 JAY E. GRENIG & WILLIAM C. GLEISNER III, EDISCOVERY & DIGITAL 
EVIDENCE § 1:5 (Westlaw 2012). 
45.  Understanding Metadata, NISO 1 (2004), http://www.niso.org/publications/press/ 
UnderstandingMetadata.pdf. 
46.  Id.  
47.  Id.  
48.  Id.  
49.  Id.  
50.  Id.  
51.  See What Is SEO/ Search Engine Optimization?, SEARCH ENGINE LAND, 
http://searchengineland.com/ guide/what-is-seo (last visited Apr. 21, 2013). 
52.  Chapter 1:  Types of Search Engine Ranking Factors, SEARCH ENGINE LAND, 
http://searchengineland.com/guide/seo/types-of-search-engine-ranking-factors (last visited Apr. 
21, 2013); see also SEO - Relevance and Authority, SEO CONSULT (June 19, 2008), 
http://www.seoconsult.com/seoblog/about-seo/seo-relevance-and-authority.html. 
53.  Grimmelmann, supra note 18, at 56. 
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specific information about a web page.54 
The interplay between all of the factors that compose search engines 
has led to an interesting set of laws that must consider the relationship 
between various legal doctrines.55  The following section will provide a 
glimpse into Google’s Autocomplete approach to search engine queries, 
and how it affects the search engine law as it traditionally stood. 
B.  Google’s Autocomplete Algorithm and How It Changes Search Engine 
Functionality 
As described above, search engines allow individuals to gather 
information by providing a site upon which a user can type in search 
terms.56  The traditional approach to searching terms is that a user types in 
a search term and clicks “Enter” to catalog a series of searches.57  Google’s 
Autocomplete feature goes one step further than simply having a user type 
in a search term before clicking “Enter.”58  By constantly altering the query 
based on each additional keystroke in the search bar, it changes the way 
search queries are generated.59  Before listing out results on a web page, 
Google actively displays results through its Autocomplete feature.60  
Google is able to provide its users with constantly updated search terms 
because its search engine weighs numerous factors before generating the 
Autocompleted suggestion.61  The Autocomplete feature therefore performs 
one additional function to the process outlined above each time a web 
search is conducted.62 
Underlying the ease and simplicity of Google’s Autocomplete 
feature—at least to the casual observer—is a complex algorithm, referred 
                                                          
54.  Kristine Schachinger, How to Use HTML Meta Tags, SEARCH ENGINE WATCH (May 
1, 2012), http://searchenginewatch.com/article/2067564/How-To-Use-HTML-Meta-Tags. 
55.  Grimmelmann, supra note 18, at 51. 
56.  SALKIN, supra note 24.  
57.  Id. 
58.  Sullivan, supra note 3.  
59.  Autocomplete, GOOGLE, http://support.google.com/websearch/bin/answer.py?hl= 
en&answer=106230 (last visited Sept. 4, 2013).  
60.  Id. 
61.  See id. 
62.  Id. (suggesting that Google does one extra step than a traditional search engine by 
suggesting results before a search query is completely entered by a user).  
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to as “Page Rank.”63  While Page Rank shares fundamental qualities with 
most SEO programs, namely the goal of providing users with relevant and 
authoritative information, it differs from other SEO programs because it 
provides users with different choices of queries.64  Google has not disclosed 
the exact algorithm it uses in its Autocomplete feature, but the attempts of 
numerous analysts to find the code behind the algorithmic process has led 
to a broad and general understanding of Autocomplete.65  Google “ranks” 
searchable content, and though debated by analysts, three primary 
contributing factors are considered in Google’s rankings of suggested 
search algorithms including: personalization, search volume, and query 
deserves freshness (“QDF”) filters.66  Personalization includes components 
such as a user’s Internet Protocol (“IP”) Address, a user’s own search 
history, the country of the search engine, and the language being used.67  
Personalized searches are always displayed first and ranked higher than any 
of the other factors.68  Search volume must reach a minimum threshold 
regarding a search term’s popularity; once this threshold is reached, the 
search will be suggested to other users.69  QDF filters describe “freshness 
layers” that are embedded within a search.70  This means that terms that 
have surges in popularity even in a short amount of time may become 
search suggestions, even without long-term popularity.71  An example of 
QDF filters at work is the Autocomplete suggestion that was linked with 
Osama Bin Laden’s death on May 1, 2011.72  In a matter of twelve minutes, 
typing “osa” into the Google search bar yielded the query displaying 
                                                          
63.  AMY N. LANGVILLE & CARL D. MEYER, GOOGLE'S PAGERANK AND BEYOND:  THE 
SCIENCE OF SEARCH ENGINE RANKINGS 28 (2006). 
64.  Compare Sullivan, supra note 3, with SEO Relevance and Authority, supra note 52.  
65.  See Rhea Drysdale, 5 Suggestions for Google Suggest, MOZ (May 10, 2011), 
http://www.seomoz.org/blog/5-suggestions-for-googles-suggested-search; see also Tom Krazit, 
Google’s Fight to Keep Search a Secret, CNET (July 15, 2010, 11:24 AM), 
http://news.cnet.com/8301-30684_3-20010696-265.html. 
66.  Drysdale, supra note 65.  
67.  Id.  
68.  Sullivan, supra note 3.  
69.  Drysdale, supra note 65.  
70.  Sullivan, supra note 3.  
71.  Id. 
72.  Danny Sullivan, Google & the Death of Osama Bin Laden, SEARCH ENGINE LAND 
(May 2, 2011, 1:39 AM), http://searchengineland.com/google-the-death-of-osama-bin-laden-
75346. 
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“Osama Bin Laden dead” after news of Bin Laden’s death.73  Therefore, the 
QDF is a short-term popularity filter that may be subject to fluctuations as 
short as one-hour intervals.
74
 
The exact weight given to each of these three components is not clear.  
However, together, they are identified as most important to Google’s 
algorithmic process.75 Google’s algorithm is neither known to the public 
nor has it been pin-pointed and described exactly by any scholar or 
expert.76  Because slight updates to the algorithm are generated almost 
every two months, understanding and deciphering the algorithm is 
problematic.77 
III.  RECENT EXAMPLES IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 
With search engines becoming a primary mode for information 
gathering and the concept of “Googling” people, places, and things 
becoming more prevalent, there may be damaging consequences when the 
comments associated with an individual or entity prove to be false.78  This 
injury is found in the Bettina Wulff lawsuit.79  According to Mrs. Wulff, 
the information that was Autocompleted as a search suggestion was 
defamatory because it wrongfully linked the former First Lady of Germany 
to prostitution, and injured her reputation.80  Wulff explained that she felt 
powerless when she lost her lawsuit against Google in a Hamburg court.81  
                                                          
73.  Id.  
74.  Sullivan, supra note 3.  
75.  See id.; see also Autocomplete, supra note 59.  
76.  See Krazit, supra note 65.  
77.  See Chris Crum, Google Algorithm Changes:  Google Just Released the Big Lists for 
August and September, WEBPRONEWS (Oct. 4, 2012), http://www.webpronews. com/google-
algorithm-changes-google-just-released-the-big-lists-for-august-and-september-2012-10 (listing 
Google’s algorithm changes); Chris Crum, Google Makes a Bunch of Changes to Autocomplete, 
WEBPRONEWS (Oct. 4, 2012), http://www.webpronews.com/google-makes-a-bunch-of-changes-
to-autocomplete-2012-10 (same).  
78.  See Harrison Polites, Melbourne Man Successively Sues Google, Seeks $339,000 in 
Defamation Damages, TECH. SPECTATOR (Nov. 1, 2012, 10:33 AM), 
http://www.technologyspectator.com.au/melbourne-man-successively-sues-google-seeks-339000-
defamation-damages (suggesting that a plaintiff may seek more damages from Google than from 
other search engines because Google’s search engine is the most popular); see also 
Grimmelmann, supra note 18, at 41 n.178. 
79.  See Lardinois, supra note 14.  
80.  See id. 
81.  See Nicholas Kulish, As Google Fills in Blank, a German Cries Foul, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 18, 2012, at A1. 
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Her husband, Christian Wulff, former President of Germany, received 
backlash from these rumors as well, affecting his image in the political 
realm.
82
 
In 2011, in Italy, Google lost a defamation suit to an Italian 
businessman, whose name remains anonymous, for suggesting that he was 
a “truffatore” (conman) and a “truffa” (fraud).83  Although Google argued 
that it should not be responsible for the Autocompleted searches that were 
based on terms that other users had typed, the Milan court ordered Google 
to remove the terms from its search suggestions.84  Moreover, in a 
Melbourne court in 2012, Google was once again held liable for its 
defamatory Autocomplete suggestions.85  Milorad Trkulja is a private 
figure who was wrongly linked to “underworld figures and activities” by 
Google’s Autocomplete suggestion.86  Google was found guilty of 
defaming Trkulja by the Australian court and Trkulja was awarded 
$200,000 in damages.87  The court analogized Google to a “news agent that 
sells a newspaper containing a defamatory article.  While there might be no 
specific intention to publish defamatory material, there is a relevant 
intention by the newsagent to publish the newspaper for the purposes of the 
law of defamation.”88  These cases may have set a valuable precedent that 
is recognized and addressed internationally. 
IV.  TORT AND PRIVACY LAWS IN AN INTERNET FORUM 
As the examples in the previous section illustrate, defamation lawsuits 
against search engines outside of the United States have become 
increasingly commonplace.  Before analyzing Google’s potential liability 
in the United States, it is necessary to analyze the causes of action under 
defamation law.  Currently, there is no uniform body of defamation law 
                                                          
82.  See id. 
83.  See Kate Solomon, Google Loses Autocomplete Lawsuit, TECHRADAR (Apr. 8, 2011), 
http://www.techradar.com/us/news/internet/google-loses-autocomplete-lawsuit-941498. 
84.  See id. 
85.  See Polites, supra note 78.  
86.  See id. 
87.  See Sottek, supra note 15.  
88.  Trkulja v. Google Inc. LLC & Anor (No 5) (2012) VSC 533, 13 (Austl.).  
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followed by all states.89  As such, this Article provides a summary of 
California defamation law pieced together by both statutes and case law.  
After summarizing California’s various causes of action relevant to a 
defamation lawsuit, this section provides a summary of the 
Communications Decency Act (“CDA”), a Congressionally enacted safe 
harbor for providers of interactive computer services. 
A.  Background of Privacy Torts 
Privacy torts are designed to prevent the invasion of “the right of 
privacy of another” by subjecting the invader to “liability for the resulting 
harm.”90 A right to privacy is invaded by unreasonably intruding the 
“seclusion of another”; “appropriat[ing] “the other’s name or likeness”; 
providing “unreasonable publicity . . . to the other’s private life”; or giving 
“publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before the 
public.”91  The specific examples referenced in Section II primarily deal 
with injury to reputation; therefore, the relevant privacy torts are false light 
and defamation. 
1.  False Light 
The false light cause of action is a privacy tort that was judicially 
created to prevent injury or damage to an individual’s emotions.92  In its 
inception, the tort was only cognizable in common law; however, since its 
first use, a few jurisdictions have codified the tort.93  In California, this tort 
is governed by the Second Restatement of Torts.94  A plaintiff can establish 
a prima facie case for false light by proving that “[1] publicity [is given] to 
a matter concerning another . . . before the public in a false light . . . [2] the 
                                                          
89.  See generally Defamation Law - Guide to Libel and Slander Law, HG.ORG, 
http://www.hg.org/defamation.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2013) (noting that defamation law is 
addressed primarily by state legislatures and that the statutes’ requirements may differ from state-
to-state). 
90.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A(1) (1977). 
91.  Id. § 652A(2). 
92.  See Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, False Light Invasion of Privacy:  The Light That 
Failed, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 364, 372–3 (1989). 
93.  See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202–04 (LexisNexis 2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS  § 9-1-
28.1 (1956); see generally Zimmerman, supra note 92, at 375 (explaining that an “examination of 
the early [false light] cases suggest that judges were responding to a quite different set of 
concerns,” when they developed false light law). 
94.  See Fellows v. Nat’l Enquirer, Inc., 42 Cal.3d 234, 238–39 (1986) (citing section 652 
of the Restatement (Second of Torts) for its rule on false light).  
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false light . . . is highly offensive to a reasonable person, and [3] the actor 
had knowledge of or acted with reckless disregard as to the falsity . . . of 
the matter.”
95
  Along with these elemental aspects of the tort, at least one 
legal scholar further contends that two requirements must be satisfied in 
order to establish a cause of action for this tort: that the falsehood of the 
information be substantially material, and must be available to a significant 
portion of the population.96 
2.  Defamation 
California courts routinely define defamation as an “invasion of [an 
individual’s] interest in [his] reputation.”97  The requisite elements for a 
defamation cause of action are publication of an unprivileged, false 
statement of fact, which has an inclination to injure or cause special 
damage to the individual about whom the statement is made.98 
In this context, publication means communication to a third party who 
understands the derogatory “meaning of the statement and its application to 
the person [about] whom [the] reference is made.”99  The publication 
involved may be made to a single individual or to the public at large.100  
The manner of publication delineates the two subsets of defamation—libel 
and slander.101  Libel requires the publication to be in a fixed medium of 
expression, such as a writing, printing, picture, or effigy.102  Slander, by 
contrast, involves an oral utterance, such as via the radio, or dissemination 
via other mechanical means.103  The increased prevalence of the Internet 
has made it difficult to distinguish whether a false, unprivileged statement 
of fact constitutes libel or slander, as communication via this medium often 
                                                          
95.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977). 
96.  Zimmerman, supra note 92, at 370–71. 
97.  See London v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 619 F. Supp. 2d 854, 864 (N.D. Cal. 2009); 
Gilbert v. Sykes, 147 Cal. App. 4th 13, 27 (2007); Ringler Assocs. Inc. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 80 
Cal. App. 4th 1165, 1179 (2000). 
98.  See Wong v. Jing, 189 Cal. App. 4th 1354, 1369 (2010). 
99.  Smith v. Maldonado, 72 Cal. App. 4th 637, 645 (1999).  
100.  Id. at 645. 
101.  CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 45–46 (West 2012). 
102.  Id. § 45. 
103.  Id. § 46. 
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involves oral utterances and writings.104 
3.  Publisher v. Distributor 
Traditional tort law distinguishes two sets of entities, publishers and 
distributors of information, which may be liable for defamatory 
statements.105  Publishers have editorial control over information that is 
transmitted (such as newspapers), and may be held liable if at least 
negligence is shown in its relaying of information to the public.106  A 
distributor of information simply makes information published by others 
available (such as a public library or newsstand), and may or may not know 
that the content of the published material is defamatory.107  A distributor is 
therefore held liable through a plaintiff’s prima facie showing of a case, as 
well as “showing that the distributor had actual knowledge of the 
defamatory content or should have reasonably known of the defamatory 
nature of the work.”108  The following section will show how these 
definitions are altered within an Internet context, and the difficulty that 
arises in attributing liability in an Internet realm. 
4.  Difficulty in Applying Privacy Torts to an Internet Context 
The Internet has complicated the traditional, underlying principles of 
privacy torts that once simply implicated only two parties: the defendant 
who made the defamatory statement and the victim.109  These 
complications are a result of the multiple parties involved on the Internet 
forum, which can include search engine operators, website operators, and 
                                                          
104.  See Julie C. Sipe, "Old Stinking, Old Nasty, Old Itchy Old Toad":  Defamation Law, 
Warts and All (A Call for Reform), 41 IND. L. REV. 137, 145–48 (2008) (discussing the challenges 
of determining the distinctions between libel and slander, and elaborating on the impact of new 
technologies). 
105.  Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Liability of Internet Service Provider for Internet or E-
mail Defamation, 84 A.L.R. 5TH 169, 177 (2000). 
106.  Id.  
107.  Grace v. eBay Inc., 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 192, 199 (2004). 
108.  Barry J. Waldman, Note, A Unified Approach to Cyber-libel:  Defamation on the 
Internet, a Suggested Approach, 6 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 9, 33 (1999).  
109.  See generally Sewall K. Patel, Note, Immunizing Internet Service Providers from 
Third-Party Internet Defamation Claims:  How Far Should Courts Go?, 55 VAND. L. REV. 647, 
658–60 (indicating that before the passage of the Communication Decency Act, courts attempted 
to apply common law defamation principles to defamation cases involving the Internet). 
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Internet service providers.110  Courts have difficulty determining whether 
these Internet stakeholders are “publishers” of offensive content, and 
therefore subject to liability under one of the many privacy torts, or are 
merely “distributors” of offensive content and thus, immune from 
liability.111  Two decisions, Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc.112 and Stratton 
Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co.,113 both rendered in the early half of 
the 1990s, illustrate this point. 
In Cubby, CompuServe operated an “electronic library,” in which 
subscribers paid a monthly subscription to access, among other sources, 
150 special interest forums.114  CompuServe did not operate the forums, but 
instead entered into contractual arrangements with independent companies 
who agreed to “manage, review, create, delete, edit and otherwise control 
the contents” of the various forums.115  The Journalism Forum contained 
content from Rumorville USA (“Rumorville”), a daily newsletter detailing 
news and gossip in the entertainment industry.116  Due to Rumorville’s 
success, Cubby, Inc. (“Cubby”), attempted to replicate Rumorville’s 
business model by creating an electronic database that electronically 
disseminated news and gossip in the television, news, and radio industry 
under the pseudonym “Skuttlebut.”117  In what was likely an effort to stave 
off competition, Rumorville began publishing disparaging comments about 
Cubby’s database, and how the database managed to access its 
information.118  In response, Cubby filed a lawsuit seeking to recover 
damages for libelous statements; it named the operator of Rumorville and 
CompuServe, Inc. as defendants in the lawsuit.119 
                                                          
110.  See generally id. at 658–60 (indicating that before the passage of the 
Communication Decency Act, courts attempted to apply common law defamation principles to 
defamation cases involving the Internet).  
111.  See, e.g., Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); 
Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 
1995), superseded by statute, Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 
56 (1996) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012)).  
112.  Cubby, 776 F. Supp. 135. 
113.  Stratton Oakmont, Inc., 1995 WL 323710. 
114.  Cubby, 766 F. Supp. at 137.  
115.  Id.  
116.  Id. 
117.  Id. at 138. 
118.  Id.  
119.  Id.  
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After a litany of pre-trial documents were filed, many of which 
asserted that CompuServe was merely a distributor, as opposed to a 
publisher, of Rumorville, the district court granted CompuServe’s motion 
for summary judgment.120  This decision was rendered on the undisputed 
fact that CompuServe did not have editorial control of the information that 
was uploaded onto Rumorville’s site.121  Moreover, without editorial 
control over the content on Rumorville, CompuServe lacked knowledge of 
the defamatory statements—a point that was exacerbated by the immense 
volume and speed with which information was uploaded to CompuServe’s 
electronic library.122 
Four years later, the New York Supreme Court rendered a decision 
that threatened the existence of various Internet stakeholders.  In Stratton 
Oakmont Inc., v. Prodigy Services Co., Prodigy Services owned an online 
bulletin board, “Money Talk,” which allowed monthly subscribers to “post 
statements regarding stocks, investments and other financial matters.”123  
Although Prodigy Services owned the various bulletin boards, it contracted 
with third parties, known as bulletin Board Leaders, who “participate[d] in 
[bulletin] board discussions and undert[ook] promotional efforts to 
encourage usage and increase users.”124  By the time the lawsuit was filed, 
Money Talk had at least two million subscribers.125 
The events that precipitated the lawsuit involved defamatory 
statements made by an anonymous user regarding the employees of 
Stratton Oakmont, an investment-banking firm.126  The anonymous user 
alleged that Stratton Oakmont had committed “fraudulent acts in 
connection with the initial public offering” of Solomon-Page, and that the 
investment banking firm employed a “cult of brokers who either lie[d] for a 
living or [got] fired.”127 
Upset by the defamatory statements posted on a bulletin board read 
by at least two million subscribers, Stratton Oakmont filed a defamation 
lawsuit against Prodigy Services.  In its complaint, Stratton Oakmont 
                                                          
120.  Cubby, 766 F. Supp. at 144. 
121.  Id. at 140. 
122.  Id. at 141. 
123.  Stratton Oakmont, Inc., 1995 WL 323710, at *1. 
124.  Id. 
125.  Id.  
126.  Id. 
127.  Id. 
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asserted that Prodigy Services was a publisher of the offensive material 
because it: (1) likened itself to a newspaper and claimed to have editorial 
control over the “degree of nudity and unsupported gossip its editors 
tolerate[d]”; (2) used software to pre-screen bulletin boards for offensive 
material; (3) promulgated editorial content guidelines for the bulletin Board 
Leaders to follow; and (4) developed a form apology that bulletin Board 
Leaders were required to send if offensive material was posted to the 
site.128  Prodigy Services countered that it had changed its editorial policy 
and no longer reviewed each bulletin board post.129 
After weighing the evidence, the New York Supreme Court 
concluded that Prodigy Services was a publisher because it controlled the 
bulletin board leader’s actions, created guidelines, and most importantly, 
claimed to control the content on its website.130 Accordingly, the court 
granted Stratton Oakmont’s motion for summary judgment.131 
Both of these cases were landmark cases in a time where no prior 
legal analysis was on point.  However, over time and through the passage 
of the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”), the decisions of both cases 
were reassessed.  The following section will analyze the CDA and how it 
changed the analysis within this area of law.  Nonetheless, the cases 
detailed above are still important to consider, as their holdings emphasize 
significant legal concerns and progress of Internet law on this issue over 
time. 
B.  Communications Decency Act 
To address the conflicting analyses courts used to apply defamation 
law to the various Internet stakeholders,132 Congress enacted the CDA in 
1996.133  The CDA takes the original definitions of “publisher” and 
“distributor” and applies them to an Internet context.134  The purpose of the 
                                                          
128.  Id. at *2–3. 
129.  Stratton Oakmont, Inc., 1995 WL 323710, at *3. 
130.  Id. at *5. 
131.  Id. at *1. 
132.  See generally id. (finding online service providers that voluntarily filter 
some messages to be liable for all messages then transmitted, while providers who 
ignore problematic posts and do not review any posts escape liability altogether). 
133.  47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012). 
134.  See generally id. (explaining the distinction between publishers and 
distributors when applying these definitions to an Internet context).  
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CDA is to “promote the free exchange of information and ideas over the 
Internet and to encourage voluntary monitoring for offensive or obscene 
material.”
135
  The CDA immunizes interactive computer service providers 
from civil liability for defamatory material that a user finds through its 
search engine by prohibiting such providers from being “treated as the 
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another. . . .”136  An 
interactive computer service is defined as “any information service, system, 
or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by 
multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or 
system that provides access to the Internet. . . .”137  Furthermore, providers 
or users of an interactive computer service cannot be held liable for 
attempting to restrict access to what the provider considers to be improper 
material.138  Both of these qualifications effectively lead to the result that an 
interactive computer service provider would not be held liable for 
defamation, unless the provider itself was actually the author or publisher 
of the defamatory content.139 
C.  Distinguishing Between an Interactive Computer Service and 
Information Content Provider 
Services that are considered the author or publisher of defamatory 
content are referred to as information content providers, which include 
people or entities “responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or 
development of information” on the Internet or on a website.140  The 
following section will: (1) analyze the differences between interactive 
computer service provider and information content providers, and (2) 
highlight instances in which classification of provider may face liability for 
material posted online. 
In Stratton Oakmont, the court held that any Internet service provider 
                                                          
135.  Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc. (Carafano I), 339 F.3d 1119, 1122 
(9th Cir. 2003).  
136.  § 230(c)(1).  
137.  Id. § 230(f)(2). 
138.  Id. § 230(c)(2).  
139.  See Zitter, supra note 105, at 177–78 (stating that an online computer 
service can be defined as a publisher and held liable for statements made on boards 
operated by the service). 
140.  § 230(f)(3). 
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could be held liable for defamation.141  However, the CDA provides 
“robust” immunity for websites and Internet service providers.142  
According to precedent, mere general revisions of online material do not 
render websites “information content providers.”143  To be considered an 
information content provider subject to civil liability, a website operator 
must provide material contributions to unlawfulness.144  Contributing 
content in this manner means more than providing “third parties with 
neutral tools to create web content, even if the website knows that the third 
parties are using such tools to create illegal content.”145  This conclusion 
was rendered through application of the CDA to the cases outlined below. 
An opinion authored by the Ninth Circuit, Carafano v. 
Metrosplash.com, helped establish what the term “neutral tool” entails and 
how it applies to information content providers.146  In Carafano, an 
unknown individual created a fake Matchmaker.com (“Matchmaker”) 
profile for the actress Christianne Carafano—stage name Chase 
Masterson—which included her picture and home address.147  Shortly after 
the account was created, Carafano began receiving threatening and sexually 
explicit phone calls and faxes.148  Fearing for her safety, Carafano informed 
Matchmaker that someone was using her name, likeness, and contact 
information without her permission.149  After receiving the message, 
Matchmaker immediately blocked the profile from public view and later 
deleted it.150  Nonetheless, Carafano sued Matchmaker for defamation of 
                                                          
141.  See Stratton Oakmont, Inc., 1995 WL 323710, at *3–4 (discussing 
publishers as “one who repeats or otherwise republishes a libel is subject to 
liability as if he had originally published it,” and accordingly, finding that Prodigy 
was such a publisher). 
142.  Carafano I, 339 F.3d at 1123. 
143.  Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC 
(Fair Hous. I), 521 F.3d 1157, 1169 (9th Cir. 2008).  
144.  Id. at 1168. 
145.  Goddard v. Google, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1196 (N.D. Cal. 2009).  
146.  Carafano I, 339 F.3d at 1124.  
147.  Id. at 1121.  
148.  Id.  
149.  Id. at 1122.  
150.  Id.  
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character, amongst other things.151 
Based on its interpretation of the CDA, the district court concluded 
that Matchmaker was not entitled to immunity because the company 
created user profiles after individuals completed a multiple choice and 
essay questionnaire, thereby preventing users from simply posting any 
information they desired.152  However, on appeal, the Ninth Circuit found 
that Matchmaker was protected under the CDA and was not an information 
content provider because it was not providing any content itself.153  The 
court underscored that “Matchmaker was not responsible, even in part, for 
associating certain multiple choice responses with a set of physical 
characteristics, a group of essay answers, and a photograph.”154  The fact 
that Matchmaker’s users actively and voluntarily created the content found 
on their profiles suggested that the website did not do anything to add to 
the defamation that resulted.155  Matchmaker simply provided neutral tools 
for users to voluntarily input preferences and data.156 
Further, the court in Zeran v. America Online, Inc. provided context 
for determining the liability of an Internet service provider who acts to edit 
or remove content from a site, thus giving the site control over its 
content.157  The court emphasized the importance of a website’s ability and 
necessity to self-regulate the content on its page.158  As long as this 
voluntary self-regulation is conducted “in good faith to restrict access to or 
availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, 
lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise 
objectionable, whether or not constitutionally protected,” the Internet 
                                                          
151.  Id. 
152.  Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc. (Carafano II), 207 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 
1066–68 (C.D. Cal. 2002).   
153.  Carafano I, 339 F.3d at 1124.  
154.  Id.  
155.  Id.  
156.  See id. (“[T]he fact that Matchmaker classifies user characteristics into 
discrete categories and collects responses to specific essay questions does not 
transform Matchmaker into a ‘developer’ of the ‘underlying misinformation.’”).  
157.  See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997) 
(analyzing Congressional intent underlying section 230 of the CDA).  
158.  See id. at 333 (noting that forcing computer service providers to 
regulate content would have a “chilling effect on the freedom of Internet speech”). 
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service provider is immune from liability.159  In other words, even if a 
provider receives notification of content on its website that may be 
objectionable and fails to remove it, that provider would be shielded from 
liability.160  A contrary result would prove detrimental.  Hypothetically, if 
providers were subject to liability equivalent to distributors of information, 
they would potentially face liability with each notice of potentially 
defamatory statements that would necessitate investigation of the actual 
information.161  This type of constant research could be possible for print 
publishers, but may create unique burdens in the Internet realm.162 
This holding was also supported in Jurin v. Google Inc., where the 
website operator suggested keywords pursuant to an internet advertising 
campaign.163  The court held that the keyword suggestion feature was a 
neutral tool that solely provides options to advertisers and functions in a 
manner similar to the editorial process that is protected by the CDA.164  
Thus, a website operator does not become an information content provider 
by the mere fact that the operator of the website “should have known” that 
the tools made available could potentially make the dissemination of 
defamatory content easier.165 
In a recent decision by the Ninth Circuit, the court limited the 
immunity extended to online entities under the CDA.166  In Fair Housing 
Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roomates.com, the court held that 
Roomates.com was acting as a direct publisher of materials when it 
categorized and directed users to specific information, after users answered 
a series of questions to find roommates.167  Roommates.com created 
                                                          
159.  47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A) (2012).  
160.  Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333.  
161.  Id. 
162.  Id. 
163.  Jurin v. Google, Inc., 695 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1119, 1123 (E.D. Cal. 
2010).  
164.  Id.  
165.  Goddard, 640 F. Supp. 2d at 1197–98.   
166.  Fair Hous. I, 521 F.3d 1157; see also Michael P. Bennett & Ryan T. 
Sulkin, Ninth Circuit Tightens the Belt on Immunities for Online Publishers of 
User-Generated Content, LEXOLOGY (June 8, 2007), 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=9a998c44-1ab3-4124-9d3d-
4ae2f1a5dbec.  
167.  Fair Hous. I, 521 F.3d at 1166. 
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questions regarding sex, sexual orientation, and family status.168  The 
website’s users were also given a set of pre-populated answers, essentially 
forcing subscribers to answer the questions as a condition for using the 
website’s services.169  “By requiring subscribers to provide the information 
as a condition of accessing its service,” along with a limited set of pre-
populated answers, Roommates.com was not only a passive transmitter, but 
also a developer of that information.170  This is important because the CDA 
provides immunity only if the interactive computer service does not create 
or develop the information “in whole or in part.”171  The court compared 
Roommates.com to a site that acted as “a forum designed to publish 
sensitive and defamatory information, and suggested the type of 
information that might be disclosed to best harass and endanger the 
targets.”172  It established that online entities that post content that may be 
in part user-generated should evaluate whether the bulk of the content they 
produce is illegal or defamatory in nature, leading a court to deem the 
entity acting beyond a neutral publisher of information.173  Therefore, 
Roommates.com was acting as an information content provider by 
developing information, partially in the form of pre-populated answers 
directed toward divulging discriminatory information.174 
The distinguishing factor between Fair Housing and the previously 
analyzed cases is that the other cases involved website operators neither 
encouraged  defamatory content nor increased the ability of users to post 
defamatory content.175  Instead, these sites were based on voluntary inputs 
                                                          
168.  Id. at 1164. 
169.  Id. at 1165-66.   
170.  Id. at 1166.   
171.  47 U.S.C. §230(f)(3) (2012).  
172.  Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 
489 F.3d 921, 928 (9th Cir. 2007).  
173.  Bennett & Sulkin, supra note 166.  
174.  Fair Hous. I, 521 F.3d at 1164. 
175.  Compare id. at 1166 (noting that Roommates.com was not immunized 
from liability because it acted like a developer of information, rather than passive 
transmitter of information), with Carafano I, 339 F.3d at 1124 (holding that 
Matchmaker was protected under the CDA and was not an information content 
provider because it was not providing any content itself), and Jurin, 695 F. Supp. 
2d at 1119, 1123 (holding that a keyword suggestion feature is a neutral tool that 
solely provides options to advertisers and functions in a matter similar to the 
editorial process that is protected by the CDA).  
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that allowed users to select the information they deemed most relevant.176  
This is the essence of a “neutral tool” operation.177  However, the 
Roommates.com website did more; primarily because of its design—the 
website forced its users to make choices based on a limited number of 
discriminatory preferences, through criteria that was illegal and prohibited 
by the Fair Housing Council.178  Therefore, in assessing a website 
operator’s status as an “interactive computer service” and an “information 
content provider,” the distinguishing factor is whether the processes used to 
generate information are operating on neutral tools, rather than directing 
users toward pre-set and inherently illegal functionality.179 
V.  GOOGLE’S POTENTIAL LIABILITY 
To determine Google’s liability for the defamatory suggestions that 
are generated through its Autocomplete feature, a court must first 
determine whether or not the feature is a neutral tool.180  In other words, 
Google must first be categorized as either an interactive computer service 
provider and protected under the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”), 
or an information content provider operating by using something beyond a 
neutral tool and not protected under the CDA.181  In making this 
assessment, this section will discuss Google’s Autocomplete feature in 
relation to the control Google has over its search suggestions with respect 
                                                          
176.  See, e.g., Jurin, 695 F. Supp. 2d at 1119, 1123 (holding that keyword 
suggestion feature is a neutral tool that solely provides options to advertisers and 
functions in a matter similar to the editorial process that is protected by the CDA). 
177.  See Fair Hous. I, 521 F.3d at 1169 (“[P]roviding neutral tools to carry 
out what may be unlawful or illicit searches does not amount to ‘development’ for 
purposes of the [CDA] immunity exception.”).  
178.  Id. at 1166, 1172.  
179.  See id. at 1172 (drawing a distinction between Roommates.com, which 
“force[d] subscribers to divulge” personal information about themselves, and the 
website in Carafano, which was “designed to match romantic partner depending in 
their voluntary input”).  
180.  See Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com 
(Fair Hous. I) 521 F.3d 1157, 1174 n.37 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Providing neutral tools 
for navigating websites is fully protected by CDA immunity, absent substantial 
affirmative conduct on the part of the website creator promoting the use of such 
tools for unlawful purposes.”).  
181.  See 47 U.S.C. §230 (2012); see also Jurin v. Google, Inc., 695 F. Supp. 
2d 1117, 1122 (E.D. Cal. 2010). 
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to its algorithmic variability. 
A.  Google’s Autocomplete Functionality 
The analysis of Google’s liability in the search suggestions that are 
generated must first begin by defining what Google actually has control 
over— a factual question that may be deciphered by understanding 
Google’s role in Autocomplete.182  To determine Google’s role, the issue 
then turns into a legal question of whether Google is an interactive 
computer service provider, an information content provider acting with a 
neutral tool, or an information content provider acting with a feature that is 
beyond a neutral tool.183  Google seems to fall somewhere in between the 
definitions of a typical publisher and distributor, and its Autocomplete 
feature may hence be acting in a way beyond a neutral publisher.184 
Google is not publishing the suggested search term first-hand; rather, 
it simply hones in on particular searches based off of the several factors 
through its algorithm, which include personalization, query deserves 
freshness (“QDF”) factors, and search volume.185  Conversely, if in fact 
Google was regarded as a publisher of information in its search 
suggestions, then it may be liable for a tort-based action.186  The fact that 
Google has the ability to alter and adapt what one can find on the Internet 
through searches indicates that it is acting beyond the scope of just making 
information publicly available, as would a common publisher of 
information.187  In this manner, Google does not simply convey 
                                                          
182.  See Zitter, supra note 105, at 177.  
183.  Id.   
184.  A publisher “retains editorial control over of the information it sends 
out, is held accountable [if a prima facie cause is found] and at least negligence is 
shown in its action, while a distributor “may only be held liable on a plaintiff’s 
prima face case [by] showing that the distributor had actual knowledge of the 
defamatory content or should have reasonably known of the defamatory nature of 
the work.”  Id.; see also Grace v. eBay Inc., 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 192, 198–99 (2004). 
185.  See Drysdale, supra note 65; see also Crum, Google Algorithm 
Changes:  Google Just Released the Big Lists for August and September, supra 
note 77; Crum, Google Makes a Bunch of Changes to Autocomplete, supra note 
77.  
186.  See Fair Hous. I, 521 F.3d at 1171 (describing how websites that use 
functionality beyond a “neutral tool” may be subject to liability).  
187.  Bennett & Sulkin, supra note 166.  
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information, as a proper distributor would.188  Instead, its Autocomplete 
feature acts by providing information in an actively edited manner subject 
to an algorithm created by Google itself; it generates suggestions that a user 
has not yet typed out specifically,189 and directs users toward specific 
searches.190  Ultimately, the answer to this threshold, yet dispositive 
question can be resolved by determining whether the artificial intelligence 
set up by Google acts as a producer of the algorithm.191  But again, Google 
weighs several factors that may be outside of its control to generate its 
search suggestions that arguably would not make Google liable as an 
information content provider, under a strict application of liability as this 
entity.192 
For purposes of this Article, Google may be regarded as lying in-
between the definitions of an interactive computer service and an 
information content provider, as an Algorithm-Based Republisher 
(“ABR”).193  An analysis of the extent of control that Google has and 
exercises over the Autocomplete search suggestions will provide context as 
to Google’s role as an information content provider.194  After this 
assessment, the analysis will then turn on whether Google is using 
technology that would be deemed beyond a neutral tool to assess Google’s 
liability for Autocomplete suggestions. 
B. Google’s Control Over Search Suggestions 
Though Google claims that the produced search suggestions are based 
on factors that are not completely within its control, Google can impose 
better restrictions and filters on its search suggestions.195  For example, 
Google excludes a narrow class of search queries related to pornography, 
                                                          
188.  See Zitter, supra note 105.  
189.  Sullivan, supra note 3.  
190.  Bennett & Sulkin, supra note 166. 
191.  See Smith v. Maldonado, 72 Cal. App. 4th 637, 652 (1999).   
192.  See Drysdale, supra note 65.  
193.  This term is coined by the author and used throughout the Article.  
194.  See Bennett & Sulkin, supra note 166.  
195.  John Carney, Does Google Filter Out Controversial Conservatives from 
Search Suggestions?, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 1, 2010, 8:21 AM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/does-google-filter-out-controversial-
conservatives-from-search-suggestions-2010-2. 
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violence, hate speech, and copyright infringement.196  Google, however, 
does not have a procedure in place for removing negative search 
suggestions that are generated.
197
  Google only does this in very specific 
instances, and does not even have a form to request removal.198  Arguably, 
Google should have an area on its website that allows users to alert Google 
of any defamatory suggestions that they may find.199 
In terms of actual control over search suggestions, Google actively 
restricts certain words and sites from being exposed to the public,200 so the 
option is clearly available to Google to control what can and cannot be 
searched in its search box through the use of meta tags.201  Google’s 
algorithm may search for meta tags with information relevant to one’s 
search, optimizing a search for a user.202  Furthermore, Google has begun to 
restrict Autocomplete search suggestions that involve torrent tracking and 
online piracy sites.203  These changes initially appeared in 2011, when 
“suggestions for terms such as BitTorrent, RapidShare, and MegaUpload 
were removed.”204  In August 2012, Google declared that the ranking of 
websites and search suggestions would also take into account online piracy 
in determining the weight given to its search suggestions.205  That is, 
websites that are associated with online piracy are likely to be lowered in 
the ranking process, if not removed from search suggestions at all.206 
                                                          
196.  Angotti, supra note 17.   
197.  Sullivan, supra note 3.  
198.  Id. 
199.  Id. 
200.  Id.  
201.  Id.; see Kristine Schachinger, How to Use HTML Meta Tags, SEARCH 
ENGINE WATCH (May 1, 2012), http://search enginewatch.com 
/article/2067564/How-To-Use-HTML-Meta-Tags (showing that meta tags help 
search engines control sites). 
202.  See Schachinger, supra note 201. 
203.  Ian Paul, Google Restricts Pirate Bay from Autocomplete, Instant 
Search Features, PCWORLD (Sept. 11, 2012, 7:53 AM), 
http://www.pcworld.com/article/262134/google_restricts_pirate_bay_from_autoco
mplete_ instant_search_features.html. 
204.  Id.  
205.  Id.  
206.  Id. 
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Google’s control also extends to its active restriction of web sites and 
certain Google features in a number of countries.207  For example, the 
Chinese government has exerted substantial control over what can be 
searched for online, and is one of the strictest countries in terms of 
censoring the Internet.208  The censorship found in China does not adhere to 
any specific laws or regulations.209  The Chinese government “has created 
more than sixty regulations on Internet censorship and local authorities 
have their own rules, regulations, and policies.”210 A background of 
Google’s role in China is as follows: 
When Google first arrived in China, it signed an agreement with 
the Chinese government, agreeing to purge its Chinese search 
results of banned topics.  Whether this agreement was 
reasonable or not is actually not an arguable issue for Google 
because it signed the agreement and will breach the agreement 
by not purging the search.211 
This shows that Google has the ability to control what is put forth on 
its search platform, and that the company has the ability to specifically alter 
its site to suit its users.  Hence, this case further supports the notion that 
Google has some ability to maintain control over what search results are 
populated by Autocomplete. 
Google releases information about government requests to remove 
                                                          
207.  See, e.g., Claire Cain Miller, As Violence Spreads in Arab World, 
Google Blocks Access to Inflammatory Video, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/14/technology/google-blocks-inflammatory-
video-in-egypt-and-libya.html?_r=0 (describing how Google blocked access to the 
YouTube video ridiculing the Prophet Muhammad in Egypt and Libya after four 
American diplomatic personnel were killed in Libya).  Conversely, the 
governments of China and Iran have restricted access to certain Google services.  
Frederic Lardinois, China Blocks Virtually All of Google’s Web Services as 18th 
Party Congress Gets Underway, TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 9, 2012), 
http://techcrunch.com/2012/11/09/china-blocks-virtually-all-of-googles-web-
services-as-18th-party-congress-gets-underway/; Saeed Kamali Dehghan, Iran Set 
to Block Access to Google, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 23, 2012, 6:17 PM), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/sep/23/iran-block-access-google-gmail. 
208.  KENNETH A. CUTSHAW ET. AL., CORPORATE COUNSEL’S GUIDE TO 
DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA §26:33 (3d ed. 2012). 
209.  Id. 
210.  Id. 
211.  Id.  
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content or access private user data as part of its Transparency Report every 
six months.212  For example, from July to December 2012, “a total of 467 
court orders and 561 other requests (by executives, police, etc.) were given 
to Google to remove almost 12,000 pieces of content from their search 
index.”213  Further, “governments sent over 18,000 requests for access to 
the personal data of 28,562 users worldwide.”214  In some cases, Google 
did not comply with the requests, but in other cases—including requests 
from Brazil and the United States—”Google’s compliance with user data 
requests exceeded 90 percent.”215  For example, from Argentina, Google 
“received a court order to remove 120 search results for linking to sites that 
allegedly referenced individuals.”216  Google did not remove the requested 
content, because it was unable to find the individuals referenced in the 
URLs linked to the court order.217  Google also received a court order from 
India that led to the removal of 360 search results containing adult videos 
which violated personal privacy rights.218 
Google receives a large volume of removal requests, making this 
process fairly difficult.219  These requests take place in an all-manual, 
people-driven process, which requires time and energy from a human 
source. 220  In the Government section of its Transparency Report, Google 
explains that “some content removals are requested due to allegations of 
defamation, while others are due to allegations that the content violates 
local laws prohibiting hate speech or adult content.”221  Further, Google’s 
                                                          
212.  Miranda Miller, Google Reveals More Government Search Censorship 
Requests, SEARCH ENGINE WATCH (June 19, 2012), 
http://searchenginewatch.com/article/2185571/Google-Reveals-More-
Government-Search-Censorship-Requests.  
213.  Id. 
214.  Id. 
215.  Id. 
216.  Transparency Report, GOOGLE, 
http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/government/ (last visited 
Sept. 4, 2013). 
217.  Id. 
218.  Id. 
219.  Miller, supra note 212.  
220.  Id.  
221.  Transparency Report, supra note 216. 
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Transparency Report goes on to explain that “[l]aws surrounding these 
issues vary by country, and the requests reflect the legal context of a given 
jurisdiction.”
222
  Google adheres to these laws when receiving removal 
requests even if the removal request content does not violate their own 
guidelines.223  This is seen in the removal of three of fourteen videos from 
YouTube, after the Thailand Ministry of Information, Communication and 
Technology explained that the videos allegedly insulted the monarchy, 
violating Thailand’s lèse-majesté law.224  Google explained that it restricted 
a few of the videos “from view in Thailand out of respect for local law.”225  
Therefore, Google may comply with court orders that request search result 
removals, even if this detracts the company from its goal of democracy on 
the Internet.226  This shows that Google acknowledges liability for what is 
produced by the search engine and through the Autocomplete feature.  
However, it also shows that this process may be lengthy and that requests 
may be admitted or denied, subject to Google’s interpretation of the 
issue.227 
C. Google’s Autocomplete Feature Is Essentially a Neutral Tool, But May 
Have Additional Functionality 
The preceding analysis shows that Google would likely be deemed an 
interactive computer service provider and an information content 
provider—however, whether the ABR acts as something more than a 
“neutral tool” is still vague.  Google’s Autocomplete function operates by 
providing suggestions as a user types in a search term within a search 
bar.228  It functions differently than the website in Fair Housing, which 
provided a limited set of options that a user can choose from.229  Here, 
Google is not providing a limited number of options to search from with its 
                                                          
222.  Id.  
223.  Miller, supra note 212.  
224.  Transparency Report, supra note 216. 
225.  Id. 
226.  Miller, supra note 212.  
227.  See id.  
228.  Sullivan, supra note 3.  
229.  See Fair Hous. I, 521 F.3d at 1161–62 (noting that users’ search results 
returned profile pages of other users that specifically matched similar information, 
criteria, and interests as them). 
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Autocomplete feature per se—rather, it is providing a glimpse of the 
numerous searches that are produced from the search itself.230 
The fact that Google is a seemingly neutral tool, at least on the 
surface, does not speak toward its ability to portray someone in a 
defamatory context.231  The cases analyzed above suggest that a website 
which makes the process of defamation easier may not be shielded under 
CDA’s protection.232  Here, the ABR arguably uses its own functions to 
generate the searches that are defamatory.  That Google retains the control 
to limit what is generated by its algorithm does not, standing alone, make it 
susceptible to liability, as the CDA protects an internet provider’s ability to 
edit content.233  However, the aspect of control, in conjunction with the 
defamatory suggestions arising instantaneously upon entering just a few 
letters of an individual’s name—which arguably makes the defamation 
easier to see—likely makes Google more than just a neutral internet service 
provider.234 
VI.  CONCLUSION AND CALL TO ACTION 
A. Google’s Liability as an Algorithm-Based Republisher (“ABR”) 
Since Google is deemed through this Article to be an Algorithm-
Based Republisher (“ABR”), an in-between of a typical distributor or 
publisher, Google’s liability also should fall somewhere in between the two 
extremes.  Numerous attempts have been made to remove liability from 
information content providers for content that is made available to the 
public and is then simply distributed by search engines through the 
                                                          
230.  Sullivan, supra note 3. 
231.  See generally Goddard v. Google, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1197–98 
(N.D. Cal. 2009) (describing that a website with a function that operates using a 
neutral tool is not enough to subject it to liability under the CDA). 
232.  See generally id. (explaining that CDA immunity can be inapplicable to 
a website which practices “substantially greater involvement” in defamation, “such 
as the situation in which the website ‘elicits the allegedly illegal content and makes 
aggressive use of it in conducting its business’”). 
233.  See generally Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 333 (4th Cir. 
1997) (explaining that the CDA performs an important function of allowing 
websites time to edit their content because “liability upon notice reinforces service 
providers' incentive to restrict speech and abstain from self-regulation”). 
234.  Goddard, 640 F. Supp. 2d at 1197–98.  
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operation of a neutral tool.235  However, little research has been done that 
would suggest liability for a search engine that influences what is searched 
or asked for online.
236
 
Thus, it is safe to assume that some liability should be attributed to 
Google largely because it directs users to searches that may be defamatory 
in nature, based on an algorithm produced it produces.237  A few countries, 
namely Australia, Japan and France, have in fact found Google liable in 
certain contexts, though no case in the U.S. has been decided on the same 
issue.238  Google, however, has not directly commented on its potential 
liability.239 
It is understandable that a court would focus on Google solely as a 
publisher or distributor of information, but perhaps another standard should 
be promulgated and applied when dealing within the Internet context.  
Because the Internet is becoming the primary mode of communication, it is 
necessary to establish a legal framework that will address the challenges 
Internet communication presents.240  For the purpose of Google’s 
Autocomplete feature, courts must determine what liability an ABR has in 
generating suggestive information. 
                                                          
235.  Hannibal Travis, Opting Out of the Internet in the United States and the 
European Union:  Copyright, Safe Harbors, and International Law, 84 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 331, 348 (2008). 
236.  See generally Timothy Geigner, Google’s Autocomplete Dilemma:  
Every Concession Makes It Easier for the Next Person to Complain, TECHDIRT 
(Sept. 12, 2012, 7:21 AM), 
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20120911/06365520342 /googles-autocomplete-
dilemma-every-concession-makes-it-easier-next-person-to-complain.shtml 
(suggesting that Google has escaped liability because of its defense that its search 
engine “only reflects what people search for most often online”). 
237.  See Sullivan, supra note 3; see also notes 10–12, 13–16 and 
accompanying text.  
238.  See Angotti, supra note 6; Gardner, supra note 13; Moses, supra note 
12.  
239.  See, e.g., supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text; see also Dave Neal, 
Google Found Liable for Defamation in Australia, THE INQUIRER (Nov. 2, 2012, 
11:38 AM), http://www.theinquirer.net/inquirer/news/2222051/google-found-
liable-for-defamation-in-australia. 
240.  Young Joon Lim & Sarah E. Sexton, Internet As A Human Right:  A 
Practical Legal Framework to Address the Unique Nature of the Medium and to 
Promote Development, 7 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 295, 297 (2012). 
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However, from this analysis, given Google’s lack of control over 
what information is actually posted, limited control, at best, over the 
Autocomplete suggestions, and lack of control over what search selections 
users ultimately choose,241 it may be proper to classify the Autocomplete 
feature as a neutral tool.  This would render Google protected under the 
Communications Decency Act (“CDA”) as an interactive computer service 
provider.242  Though this conclusion seems fair based on precedent, a 
proper legal framework must be developed regarding Autocomplete 
technology, in order to take a firmer stance on the issue. 
B. Suggestions for Google, Moving Forward 
Though it cannot be stated with certainty what Google can do to avoid 
liability for what is generated through its Autocomplete feature, analysts 
have assessed that Google may perform certain functions to avoid liability.  
A few suggestions for improving the Google Autocomplete feature and 
Google’s subsequent liability include: (1) creating a support area that could 
allow Google to assess what users’ qualms may be, which would allow 
Google to take care of the problem before any legal liability manifests; (2) 
initiating a central webmaster message which automates messages such as: 
“Google has detected that your website is ranking for [your name scam];” 
(3) developing a reporting tool, in which individuals may report 
misinformation; and (4) improving  its algorithm.243 
Though these are not quick fixes by any means, they may help 
Google avoid liability during the interim of establishing the company’s role 
on the Internet.  This issue is an important one given the rapid proliferation 
of similar Autocomplete technology in emerging products.244  The 
Autocomplete technology must first be assessed and placed into an 
appropriate legal framework.  Only then can Google’s responsibility to 
oversee Autocompleted search results be properly determined.  After 
establishing Google’s role, perhaps new laws that assess rapidly changing 
technology online may be dictated in the furtherance of addressing 
Autocomplete’s legal implications in Google and beyond. 
 
                                                          
241.  See Sullivan, supra note 3. 
242.  See generally 47 U.S.C. §230 (2012). 
243.  Drysdale, supra note 65.   
244.  Sullivan, supra note 3.  
